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to be amenable to the laws of the state as to transactions grow-
ing out of such business on the same bases and conditions as
govern residents of the state.
If logic and reason prevail, as these questions again come be-
fore the Court, it may be expected that properly drafted statutes
providing for service on a non-resident engaged in ordinary busi-
ness in the state, through service on an agent there, will be up-
held by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Roy CosPER.
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY LUMP SUM AWARD
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
During the past quarter of a century the legislatures of forty-
six states passed workmen's compensation acts designed to cor-
rect an outmoded system of determining fault by negligence in
industrial accidents, but in their plans they gave scant attention
to the position of the lawyer. The various schemes usually pro-
vided for the lawyer's presence in the hearing before the com-
mission, and many acts contained simple provisions for the pay-
ment of his fees. But the draftsmen did not anticipate that pay-
ment of attorneys' fees would become a major problem which
today faces the administration of workmen's compensation. The
size of contingent fees which some lawyers have collected, their
attempt to commute an award to secure lump sum payment, their
ambulance-chasing activities, have all occasioned a flood of con-
demnatory criticism.
According to Walter F. Dodd:
The ambulance-chasing activities of certain runners and
lawyers run riot in some jurisdictions, and such persons
often succeed in entrenching themselves so firmly upon com-
pensation practice that it is very difficult to shake them
off.,
Workmen's compensation is designed to award to an injured
worker or his family small payments aggregating the most ade-
quate compensation possible in each case, and the very nature
of workmen's compensation suggests that attorney fees should
account for but a small part of the costs.2 But that some lawyers
1. Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936) 304.
2. In Illinois Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1934) 355 Ill. 253, 189 N. E.
310, 311, the court said: "The fundamental purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act * * * is to recompense, partially, the workman for his
loss of earnings or earning power by reason of the injuries suffered, arising
out of and in the course of his employment. In the event that the death
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have refused to accept the spirit and purpose of the Act is mani-
fest in two ways: (1) by the large contingent fees which they
attempt to collect; (2) by their attempts to commute awards so
as to secure payment of fees in a lump sum.3 As a consequence
of pressure by lawyers and although it was intended that pay-
ments be seldom commuted,4 the lump sum settlements have
almost equalled the number of periodic awards in some juris-
dictions.5 The matter has arisen recently in Missouri in Wims
v. Herucules Contracting Co.6 The problem in that case was
whether the Court should allow attorney fees in a lump sum but
continue periodic payments to the beneficiary, or whether the
whole award must be lumped before the lawyer could receive a
commuted fee. The court chose the former alternative. The
desirability of the choice will be discussed later in the light of
various problems which will be presented.
I
Much criticism has been directed against excessive contingent
fees which have been permitted by the statutes and by the com-
missions. For the purposes of this discussion, however, little
more than an allusion can be made to the contingent fee prob-
lem. That this device is a necessary part of each act cannot be
denied, for otherwise attorneys would not undertake representa-
tion of clients in no position to pay them.7 In many jurisdictions,
however, the fees are unbelievably high. The Michigan Commit-
tee on Workmen's Compensation reports that fees of claimants'
attorneys averaged forty per cent of the awards obtained ;" in
Wisconsin, the average fee was found to be thirty-six per cent ;"
of the wage-earner follows as a result of the accidental injuries, the pur-
pose of the act is to furnish to his dependents a fund, payable in install-
ments, similar to, and in lieu of, the weekly pay check and to recompense
in part such dependents for the loss of the benefit of the earnings of the
wage-earner. It is of primary importance that this fund be safe-guarded,
so that the purpose of the act-namely, the care and support of those de-
pendents--may be accomplished." Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Com-
pensation (1936) 719, is to the same effect.
3. Note (1938) 23 Iowa L. Rev. 43, observes that fear of possible in-
validity of compromise settlements has caused the attorney to resort to
commuted settlements.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3346.
5. See discussion page 110, infra.
6. (Mo. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d) 225.
7. Report of the Joint Committee for the Study of Legal Aid (New York,
1928) 47, and Report of the Committee of Censors to the Law Association
of Philadelphia (1928) 25, both cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 22.
8. Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Commission of
Michigan Report (1911) 16, cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 23.
9. Wisconsin Bureau of Labor Statistics, Thirteenth Biennial Report
(1907-1908) 13, cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 23.
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in Pennsylvania, fees constituted from thirty to fifty per cent
of settlements;I0 in Illinois, attorneys collected one-third of
amounts awarded;" in New York, fees ranged from twenty-five
to over fifty per cent.12 A report by Edward 0. Allen indicates
very large contingent fees in California." In Employers' Lia-
bility Assurance Corp. v. Sims, 4 the Texas court affirmed a con-
tingent fee which amounted to one-third on an award of
$4,389.14. The Supreme Court of Missouri has allowed an attor-
ney to recover twenty-five per cent of a lump sum award.15
Many states, however, have imposed statutory restrictions upon
the amount of contingent fees which may be assessed. In Texas,
the lawyer is not permitted a fee exceeding one-third of the
award. In Louisiana" and Tennessee, 8 the attorney is re-
stricted to a fee not greater than twenty per cent of the award.
In Wisconsin the fee may be equal to ten per cent of the award
but never over $100,1 while in Wyoming 0 and New Mexico, 2"
the attorney is permitted only five per cent, and the former state
requires that in all events the fee must be under fifty dollars.
It is noteworthy that in Wyoming and Wisconsin there has ap-
parently been no abuse of the lump sum provision while in Texas,
as will be observed later, commutation of payments has become
the usual practice.
II
Abuse of statutory provisions permitting commutation of pay-
ments where circumstances demand it has caused the lawyer to
be further condemned. Dr. R. M. Little, Director of the
New York Rehabilitation Division, reports: "Lawyers, runners,
10. Eastman, Work Accidents and the Law (1910) 121, cited in Dodd,
op. cit. supra, note 2, at 23.
11. Report of the Employers' Liability Commission of the State of Illinois
(1910) 196.
12. New York Employers' Liability Commission, First Report (1910)
Vol. 1, p. 31.
13. Allen, Fixing of Attorney's Fees by the Industrial Accident Com-
mission (1932) 7 Cal. State Bar. J. 234.
14. (Tex. Cir. App. 1933) 67 S. W. (2d) 445; see also Georgia Casualty
Co. v. Little (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 281 S. W. 1092, in which an attorney
was permitted one-third of a $3,587.55 award.
15. State ex rel. Missouri Gravel Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensa-
tion Comm. (Mo. 1938) 113 S. W. (2d) 1034.
16. Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 8306, sec. 7d.
17. La. Dart's Gen. Stats. (1939) sec. 4411. Bordelon v. Ludeau's Lum-
ber Yard (La. 1937) 177 So. 436 refused to allow an attorney over twenty
per cent of $1,827 award.
18. Tenn. Code (1932) sec. 6886.
19. Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 102.26.
20. Wyo. Rev. Stats. (1931) secs. 124-128.
21. N. M. Stats. Ann. (1929) secs. 156-122.
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pseudo friends and leeches attached themselves to injured work-
ers who were drawing compensation and persuaded them by the
thousands to request their money as a lump sun in order that
they might get a part of it. ' 22 Claimant's attorney will always
seek a lump sum settlement because he prefers to receive his fee
in one payment rather than in checks for small amounts strung
out during as long as four hundred weeks.2 3 The injured em-
ployee, badly in need of money, quickly assents to commutation
because it brings him a large sum which he can spend immedi-
ately.24 These attitudes are reflected in the large percentage of
cases allowing lump sum awards. According to a statement in
1932 concerning the Oregon law, lump sum awards were made
in fifty per cent of the cases.25 In Illinois during the year 1927-
1928,28 lump sums were entered in over one-third of the eligible
cases. A study reveals that during 1920-1924 the Wisconsin com-
mission awarded commuted payments in about one out of every
five cases.27 As to the recipients' disposition of lump payments,
the chairman of the Idaho Industrial Accident Board remarked
that "Our experience (and we have made an investigation of
112 cases over a considerable period of time to determine what
became of this money and whether or not it has been for the
best interests of all parties as the laws intended) shows that in
over ninety per cent of these cases the money did the claimants
absolutely no good. They lost it. ' ' 28 A study in Illinois by A. C.
Gernand has indicated substantially the same results.29 The pres-
sure brought by attorneys upon the courts in seeking to collect
their fees more conveniently, has, therefore, through staggered
payments worked a manifest hardship upon the beneficial results
which workmen's compensation is designed to create.
The great majority of statutes do not specifically mention situ-
ations in which lump sum payment may be allowed an attorney.
22. Little, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 511 (1929) 171.
23. Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 309.
24. Ibid.
25. Letter of October 26, 1932, from Mr. R. E. Jackson, claim agent,
Oregon State Industrial Accident Comm., cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note2, at 724. It should be noted, however, that this letter states that at one
time lump sum payments were made in at least 80 per cent of the awards
and that reduction in the number of lump sums has been significant in
recent years. See note 67, infra.
26. From a study by A. C. Gernand, cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 724.
27. Altmeyer, The Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (1932) 67.
28. Worstell, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 511
(1929) 195.
29. Cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 727.
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The following provision in the Virginia Act is typical of most
statutes which provide for lump sum payments:
* * * in unusual cases, where the parties agree and the in-
dustrial commission deems it to be to the best interests of
the employee or his dependents, or where it will prevent
undue hardships on the employer, or his insurance carrier,
without prejudicing the interest of the employee or his de-
pendents, be redeemed, in whole or in part, by the payment
by the employer of a lump sum which shall be fixed by the
commission, but in no case to exceed the commutable value
of the future installments which may be due under this act 0
By providing for commuted payment when the commission feels
that it is for the best interests of the parties, the statute in
reality gives discretion to the commission, and in some cases to
the courts, to decide whether a lump sum payment should be
made to an attorney. How the commissions and the courts have
dealt with this discretionary power will be noted later. Numer-
ous acts provide that a lump sum award must be for the best
interests of one or both of the parties; some states require that
it be for the best interest of the injured party or those who claim
under him ;31 others direct that the best interests of both parties
constitute the basis for the award ;32 and still others provide for
lump sum payment if it is to the interest of either party.3 3 The
Vermont law provides another variation in that commutation
will not be permitted for the purpose of satisfying a debt 34
while a New Jersey statute specifically states that a lump sum
will be denied when it was sought to pay fees to doctors or
lawyers 5
Most workmen's compensation acts contain some general pro-
vision relating to the payment of attorney fees. This Vermont
statute is typical:
* * * claims of attorneys for services rendered an employee
in prosecuting a claim under the provision of this chapter
30. Va. Code (1936) sec. 1887(45).
31. Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929) c. 48, sec. 140; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c.
152, sec. 48.
32. Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 8438; Idaho Code (1932) tit. 43, sec.
1121; Ind. Burns Stats. Ann. (1933) tit. 40, sec. 1408; Ala. Code (1928)
see. 7573.
33. Cal. Deering Gen. Laws (1931) art. 4749, sec. 28; Colo. Comp. Laws(1921) sec. 4456; Del. Rev. Code (1935) art. 6090, sec. 20; Ga. Code (1933)
sees. 114-417; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 48 see. 146; Iowa Code(1935) sec. 1405; Me. Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 55, see. 27; N. C. Code (1935)
sec. 8081 (zz); S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 9460; Va. Code (1936) see.
1887(45).
34. Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) sec. 6532.
35. N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 34, secs. 15-25.
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shall be approved by the commissioner; and, when so ap-
proved, may be enforced against compensation awards in
such manner as the commissioner may direct.30
Alabama has attempted to discourage ambulance-chasing in
workmen's compensation cases by statutory provision that any
attorney who solicits or hires another to solicit compensation
cases shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine and
imprisonment.37 A further penalty automatically disbars the at-
torney upon conviction. 3 In Texas- and Missouri 0 statutes al-
low the commission to award attorney fees in either periodic or
commuted payments.
III
A survey of various decisions reveals that the courts have
interpreted the general wording of the statutes in many differ-
ent ways, leading to as many different problems. In several
instances the result of the courts' interpretation has only been
to vex administration of the acts further. In Illinois the provi-
sion relating to the commutation of payments is similar to the
Virginia statute set out above;41 the wording merely requires
that the best interests of the parties be served by lump pay-
ments.4 2 The Illinois court, however, in Illinois Zinc Co. v.
Industrial Commission-3 and Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board of
Illinois44 has held that compensation may not be lumped for the
payment of attorney fees. Although the court concedes that the
question of attorney's fees is one that should be considered in
granting a lump sum payment, it asserts by way of dicta, how-
ever, that that matter cannot be controlling. This language seems
strange in view of the facts of*the Illinois Zinc Co. case in which
a widow, besides being indebted to her attorney, also owed for
a cemetery lot, back taxes, paving assessments, and needed to
repair her cottage; nevertheless her request for a partial lump
sum payment was denied. This 1917 decision is still controlling
despite the fact noted above that an investigation in Illinois
36. Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) sec. 6558.
37. Ala. Code (1928) sec. 3998.
38. Ala. Code (1928) sec. 3998.
39. Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 8306, sec. 7c.
40. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3321 " * * * the commission may allow as
lien on the compensation, reasonable attorney's fees for services in connec-
tion with the proceedings for compensation if such services are found to be
necessary and may order the amount thereof paid to the attorney in a lump
sum or in installments."
41. See page 111, supra.
42. Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 48, sec. 146.
43. (1934) 355 Ill. 253, 189 N. E. 310.
44. (1917) 278 Ill. 164, 115 N. E. 855.
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showed lump sum payments in over one-third of the cases stud-
ied.4 5 It is also important that, during the period there studied,
$7,967,451 of compensation was paid in cases eligible for lump
summing and of this amount nearly sixty per cent was paid in
lump sums. 46
Prior to 1933, Oklahoma permitted payment to an attorney
in a sum commuted from the last payments made under the
award.47 An amendment to the workmen's compensation act in
1933 4 has, however, been construed by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court as making periodic payments mandatory and forbidding
commutation of the award for attorneys' fees.4 9 In Cornhusker's
Theatres v. Foster"o the Oklahoma court, in a caustic opinion,
dismissed the charge with the traditional remark: "The wisdom
and expediency of the amendment is a question for the legisla-
ture and not the courts."
The Alabama court devised a peculiar "solution" to the prob-
lem of payment of attorneys' fees under its act. In Woodward
Iron Co. v. Bradford,51 a 1921 case, it was held that where
periodic payments are to be made under the act, then attorneys'
fees must also be awarded over corresponding periods, because
a contrary decree would make the employer an insurer to the
extent of the attorney's fee against the death or remarriage of
a dependent widow. The court reasoned that by requiring the
employer to make a lump sum payment to an attorney, he would
be forced to make payments which would not be required of him
in the eventuality of the widow's death before the end of the
compensation period. But three years later, in Crowder v. Wood-
ward Iron Co. 2 the same court decided that it was proper for
the commission to direct payment of the attorney's fee out of
the first money paid in under the award. As the plan now oper-
ates in Alabama, before the often indigent claimant can receive
45. See page 110, supra.
46. From a study by A. C. Gernand, cited in Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 725.
47. See Interstate Window Glass Co. v. Kitchens (1932) 161 Okla. 71,
17 P. (2d) 462; Smith & Son Drilling Co. v. Cox (1933) 162 Okla. 301, 21
P. (2d) 496; Standard Roofing & Material Co. v. Wrotenbury (1933) 166
Okla. 213, 27 P. (2d) 154.
48. Okla. Laws 1933, p. 263.
49. See Cornhusker's Theatres v. Foster (1937) 181 Okla. 341, 74 P. (2d)
109. Southwestern States Tel. Co. v. State Industrial Comm. (1938) 181
Okla. 533, 75 P. (2d) 468; Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Locker (1938) 182
Okla. 318, 77 P. (2d) 749.
50. (1937) 181 Okla. 341, 74 P. (2d) 109, construed the amendment as
making mandatory payment of attorney's fees periodically.
51. 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803.
52. (1924) 211 Ala. 111, 99 So. 649.
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any compensation, he is obliged to wait until weekly payments
have satisfied the attorney's fee. But it is difficult to see how
the employer is very much less an insurer than under the rule
in Woodward Ifron Co. v. Bradford.
Under the express prohibitions of the New Jersey Act," the
courts have forbidden any commutation of payments to attor-
neys.54 In Minnesota 5 and Nebraska 8 the courts have pointed
out that statutory provisions restrict lumping of compensation
payable periodically except under agreement of the parties and
the court. Since objection by one party will defeat commutation
for lawyer's fees as well as other payments, the practice of per-
mitting lawyers to be paid in a lump sum has not been followed
where periodic payments are involved.5 7
The Texas statute permitting an attorney to collect as high
as one-third of the award5 8 has been liberally interpreted to allow
frequent consolidations of the entire award, enabling lawyers to
receive considerable fees. In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n
v. Howell,5 9 the claimant had been awarded compensation of
$7.20 per week for a period of 401 weeks. Under a contingent
fee contract the attorney was entitled to $2,512 as one-third of
that amount. Although permitting the whole amount to be
lumped, the court stated: "* * * the compensation rate is so
small, especially with the deduction of his attorney fees, it is
insufficient to support him and his family. 60 Commutation was
also allowed in Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Belinken l
where all the payments were lumped, permitting the attorney
to receive thirty per cent of a $3,833 award. An annotation in
connection with Georgia Casualty Co. v. Campbell"2 states:
And the fact, although noted only incidentally, that an
unusually large proportion of the lump sum was expressly
ordered paid to lawyers, presumably for services rendered,
53. N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 34, sees. 15-25.
54. See Serzan v. Naporowski (1924) 2 N. J. Misc. 113, 131 At]. 76.
55. See State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court of Koochiching County
(1916) 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713, L. R. A. 1916F 957.
56. See Nebraska cases cited in State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court of
Koochiching County, (1916) 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713, L. R. A. 1916F
957.
57. A similar requirement is imposed by statute in Massachusetts al-
though no cases have been decided on the point. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932)
c. 152, sec. 48.
58. Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 8306, sec. 7d.
59. (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 391.
60. Id. at 392.
61. (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 154.
62. (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 266 S. W. 854.
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has been conspicuous in a number of Texas cases that have
upheld lump sum awards.6 3
Under the ordinary provision 4 subjecting claims for legal ser-
vices to the approval of the commission, the Oregon court has
decided that what the legislature intended by granting super-
vision to the commission over attorneys' fees was to prevent an
attorney from exploiting the workman. 65 Since the Oregon Act
provides for commutation of payments at the discretion of the
commission," the court concluded that either the award or the
attorney's fee may be paid in a lump sum.6 7 Similar results ob-
tain in California 8 where the statute permits a reasonable attor-
ney's fee to be made a lien on the award.,9 In North Pacific S. S.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,70 the com-
mission had ordered a lump sum payment of twenty-five dollars
to the attorney and the balance of the award to the claimant in
periodic payments. On appeal it was contended that the act did
not specifically authorize a lump sum payment to the attorney.
But the court pointed out that the employer was not injured and
that the order conformed with the intention of the act which
directed that the attorney's fee constitute a lien upon the award;
the court further stated that the order employed the only advice
making the lien effective. A Kentucky statute7 1 has been con-
trued as specifically empowering lump sum payment to an attor-
ney by commuting sufficient final payments of compensation pay-
able under the award.7 2 The recent decision of Wims v. Hercules
Contracting Co. 73 has placed Missouri in line with those states
which, in order to satisfy an attorney's claim, allow commutation
of final payments under an award. In the Wims case, the court
allowed a contingent fee of twenty per cent to be commuted to
$1,056.60 and directed it paid to the attorneys. The balance of
the award was ordered paid to the claimant in installments of
63. (1930) 69 A. L. R. 547, 549.
64. Ore. Code (1935) tit. 49, sec. 1843b.
65. See Carr v. State Industrial Accident Comm. (1936) 153 Ore. 517,
57 P. (2d) 1278.
66. Ore. Code (1935) tit. 49, sec. 1827(k).
67. In connection with note 24, supra, it is to be noted that the present
Oregon construction has only recently been made possible through amend-
ment, Laws of 1933, c. 115, sec. 1. Following this amendment the number
of lump sum cases has markedly decreased, as Dodd has observed.
68. See North Pac. S. S. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal. (1917)
174 Cal. 500, 163 Pac. 910.
69. Cal. Deering Gen. Laws (1931) art. 4749, sec. 24(a).
70. (1917) 174 Cal. 500, 163 Pac. 910.
71. Ky. Carroll's Stats. (1936) sec. 4942.
72. McFarland v. Gilbert (Ky. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d) 473.
73. (Mo. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d) 225.
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$14.231/2 over a period of 260 weeks. The insurance company
here, as in the Alabama case 7 4 objected that this scheme would
make the employer an insurer to the attorney of the continuance
of the widow's life. But the Missouri court refuted this conten-
tion by pointing out that most compensation awards "are in a
sense conditional so long as any part of them remains to be paid
in future installments * * * ,,7" In addition to the argument
advanced by the court, it might be noted that the cases involving
payments to a widow constitute but a part of the total number
of cases which arise under the act; as to them, the objection is
obviously not valid. For example, out of 58,510 accidents in
Missouri in 1935, only 78 resulted in death.7 6
IV
Manifest variances between provisions of the acts in different
jurisdictions prevent generalization, but certain desirable trends
may be noted. It has been pointed out that, although the con-
tingent fee is a necessary part of workmen's compensation,
undesirable results in many states indicate that the fee should
be a small but adequate one. Ten or fifteen per cent would seem
satisfactory. A very small percentage, such as the five per cent
allowed in Wyoming,7 8 might cause a claimant difficulty in pro-
curing a capable attorney who would bother with his case; a
very large percentage, as contingent fees amounting to one-third
of the total award permitted by the Texas provision7D effectively
reduces almost all awards to a lump sum. This is occasioned by
the fact that if weekly installments are divided between the attor-
ney and the claimant the latter usually does not have enough
left to live on; while if an attorney is first paid a lump sum and
the balance is payable to claimant in weekly installments, these
also are often too small for adequate subsistence. Since the
majority of statutes grant the commission discretion in lumping
payments, the most wholesome interpretation appears to be that
offered by the Oregon court, 0 which allows an attorney a lump
sum derived by commutation of the latter payments under the
award, the claimant then receiving the balance in weekly install-
74. Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford (1921) 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803.
75. Wims v. Hercules Contracting Co. (Mo. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d)
225, 229.
76. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 11th Annual Report(1938) 22.
77. See note 6, supra.
78. Wyo. Rev. Stats. (1931) sec. 124-128.
79. Vernon's Tex. Stats. (1936) art. 8306, sec. 7d.
80. See discussion supra, page 115.
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ments. This arrangement removes the attorney's incentive for
having the entire award lumped. It is commendable that Mis-
souri has adopted this construction.' Under the Illinois statute
allowing commutation when "for the best interests of the part-
ies," 112 the Illinois court could also easily reach this result and
reduce the excessive number of lump sum cases with which it has
had to deal.
Of course not all states can follow this recommended construc-
tion. Some commissions are limited by express statutory prohi-
bitions against making lump awards to attorneys,83 or else the
act requires agreement by both parties to any commutation."
In these instances only further legislation can free the courts
from the shackles of the present statutory provisions. It is re-
grettable that some lawyers have exploited a system which is
vital to the welfare of the industrial class and that they have
been accused of ambulance-chasing and appropriating payments
intended for indigent families. It would seem that the profession
itself, as well as the courts and legislatures, should be interested
in correcting the situation.
AARON E. HOTCHNER.
DAMAGES AND THE OIL AND GAS LEASE-
A PROBABLE MISSOURI APPROACH
I
In most litigation the careful practitioner will "hew to the
line," but in the field of damages apparently the inclination of
the most assiduous is to let the "chips fall where they may."
As a result, the theory upon which liability in a tort action is
built may be most meticulously woven, while an exorbitant claim
for damages, devoid of a measurement theory, may be presented
to the court in the sanguine expectation that the jury will award
a small portion of the plaintiff's request. This procedure seems
to be particularly characteristic where the case involves damages
that are uncertain and indefinite. Curiously enough, however, in
one situation where damages are admittedly very uncertain, con-
81. Wims v. Hercules Contracting Co. (Mo. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d)
225.
82. Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 48, sec. 146.
83. N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) sec. 34, 15-25; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) sec.
6532.
84. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 152, sec. 48; Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929)
sec. 48-140; Minn. Mason's Stats. (1927) sec. 4285.
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